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ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
Gabriele Dara*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental economic assumption that every subject which
operates in an open market strives to maximize its profits. One method
of achieving this end would be to force all other competitors out of
the market so that the only remaining subject, being the sole producer
(i.e., reaching a monopoly), may fix as it wishes the price of the goods
it supplies. An alternate method, if it is not possible to attain a mo-
nopoly, would be to reach an agreement with the other competitors to
fix the price of the goods, each competitor thus maximizing the profits
on its own share of the market. The costs of such methods of operation
are borne by the ultimate consumer, not only in terms of price, but
also in terms of quality, since a producer able to control the price of
a product does not have any incentive to improve it. Public concern
for the harm caused by such practices has been based on the threat
they could pose, by aggregating resources and wealth in a few giant
companies, to the economic and ultimately political freedom of indi-
viduals. Nevertheless, such arguments are not free from self contradic-
tion. While antitrust legislation favors a competitive free market, it may
also prevent uncompetitive firms from being driven out of the market.
Furthermore, the sanctions imposed by such legislation may discourage
competitive firms from enlarging their share of the market through
improvements in technology or efficiency.
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1. For a legal and economic analysis of monopoly and antitrust law, see R. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977) and W. Hirsch, Law and Economics, An
Introductory Analysis (1979).
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Since the early fifteenth century, 2 common law courts have refused
to enforce contracts construed to impose an unreasonable restraint on
trade, as such contracts have been considered contrary to public policy.'
The first statute, however, which expressly condemned anti-competitive
behavior was the Sherman Act of 1890, 4 passed by the Congress of the
United States out of fear of the enormous power concentrated in the
railroad and oil trusts. The provisions of the Sherman Act, which unlike
the common law doctrine granted a right of action not only to individuals
but also to the government, were given further elaboration by the Clayton
Act of 1914,1 which expressly prohibited price discrimination and certain
types of mergers, and by the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,6
which established a federal agency of the same name to regulate com-
petition in the market.
On the other side of the Atlantic the statutory reaction to anti-
competitive practices was much slower. Apart from the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948, passed in the
United Kingdom, and the West German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschzakungen of 7.27.1957, none of the other European countries de-
veloped any substantial antitrust legislation prior to the establishment
of the EEC. 7
The antitrust provisions contained in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome,8 which established the EEC, thus take on a particular sig-
nificance for the regulation of the European economy. Not only do
those provisions represent the first exhaustive European body of rules
against anti-competitive behavior, but, because of the increased number
of nations which have become members of the EEC, they enjoy an
extensive reach. 9
2. Dyer's Case, Y.B. II Henry 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414).
3. 5 J. Holdsworth, History of English Law 58-62 (1936).
4. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1987)).
5. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (1973 & Supp. 1987)).
6. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1973 & Supp. 1987)).
7. See Hearings before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 768 (1964) (Anti-trust Development in the European Common
Market, Pts. I and 2).
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, Belgium-
Germany-France-Italy-Luxembourg-Netherlands No. 4300, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (also known
as the Treaty of Rome) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
9. EEC Treaty articles 85 and 86 provide as follows:
ARTICLE 85
I. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
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Before entering into a detailed analysis of the EEC rules on com-
petition as compared with the American antitrust legislation,10 it is useful
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not in-
dispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
ARTICLE 86
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
10. It may be useful to remember the comment of Advocate-General Mayras about
the risk of a comparative approach to EEC and United States antitrust law: "[I]t would
be bold to make a systematic rapprochement between American [antitrust] law and Com-
munity law." ICI v. Commission (Cases 48-49/69; 51-57/69) [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972]
2 C.M.L.R. 557, 570 (also known as the Dyestuffs cases).
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to make some general observations pertaining to the different purposes
pursued by the two bodies of law.
As a general remark it cannot be denied, at least in light of the
timing factor, that "the European Community has heavily borrowed
from the American antitrust experience."" Nonetheless, the purposes of
articles 85 and 86 are basically different from those underlying the
American statutes. This may be attributed to the necessity of reading
articles 85 and 86 in connection with the provisions of articles 2 and
3(f) of the Treaty of Rome. 2 Article 2 identifies as one of the main
purposes of the EEC the promotion "throughout the Community [of]
an harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and
balanced expansion ...an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between the States belonging to it.'' 3 Article 3(f)
recognizes as important the need for "the institution of a system ensuring
that competition in the Common Market is not distorted.' ' 4
Thus, it appears clearly that the goal set by the Treaty of Rome
for its antitrust regulations is economic integration within the EEC and
the creation of a common market, while still avoiding "a weakening of
competition [which] would be contrary to the goals of the Common
Market." 5
The American antitrust statutes, on the contrary, seem at first glance
to take a completely different approach. Unlike the prohibitions of the
EEC system which are designed to accomplish certain specific goals apart
from the sheer protection of competition, i.e., the economic integration
between the Member States, and which thus may tolerate anti-competitive
behavior to the extent such toleration helps to reach those goals, the
restrictions imposed by the AmeFican statutes have been interpreted for
a long time as tending mainly to ensure "free an unfettered competition
as a rule of trade,"' 6 regardless of the side benefits that any challenged
behavior may have for the economy as a whole, or for some particular
area of technological development.
11. Jones, American Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in a Comparative Per-
spective, 90 L.Q.R. 191, 193 (1974).
12. Italy v. Council and Commission (Case 32/65) [1966] E.C.R. 389, [1969] C.M.L.R.
39; Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission (Cases 6-7/73) [19741 E.C.R. 223, [1974]
1 C.M.L.R. 309.
13. EEC Treaty art. 2.
14. EEC Treaty art. 3(f).
15. Continental Can Co. v. Commission (Case 6/72) [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] 1
C.M.L.R. 199, 224.
16. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 78 S. Ct. 514, 517
(1958).
17. For a critical view of the antitrust policy based on its negative economic effects,
see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 54 (1978), where the
author concludes: "Fragmentation for its own sake confers no clear gain, and it makes
economic processes more costly."
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However, the American antitrust statutes are expressed in general
terms," and the evolutionary pattern of the judicial interpretation of
the reach of those statutes seems to be oriented toward a restrictive
reading of their provisions, and particularly of those of the Sherman
Act, in a fashion concerned more with balancing the negative and positive
effects of anti-competitive behavior than with flatly protecting compe-
tition.1 9
II. ARTICLE 85 EEC TREATY AND SECTION 1 SHE rmAN ACT
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
Section One
Section one of article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market." 20
The Treaty does not define "undertaking." However, the European
Court of Justice (the ECJ) and the Commission of the European Com-
munity (the Commission) have, in a number of cases, provided an
explanation of the meaning of that term. An "undertaking," for the
Treaty to apply, may be not only a company but also an individual, 2'
provided the natural person, otherwise out of the reach of article 85,
"engages in economic activities." 22 The profit motive, however, has not
been considered an essential feature of an "undertaking," and thus an
association of trade associations, 23 and state-owned corporations 24 (within
18. The Sherman Act applies to any "combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1987). It also applies to "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15
U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. 1987). In contrast, the Clayton Act, although clearly enumerating
several types of unlawful behavior, has been interpreted in a broad fashion in the light
of its clear connection with the Sherman Act.
19. See text accompanying infra notes 181-83.
20. EEC Treaty art. 85.
21. See Reuter v. BASF A.G., O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 254) 40 (1976), [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. D44; AOIP v. Beyrard, O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 6) 8 (1976), [1976] 1 C.M.L.R.
D14.
22. Reuter v. BASF A.G., [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at D55.
23. See IAZ Int'l Belgium SA v. Commission (Case 96/82) [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 276;
FRUBO v. Commission (Case 71/74) [1975] E.C.R. 563, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 123.
24. See Italy v. Commission (Case 41/83) [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 368; and R. Schulte-
Braucks, European Telecommunications Law in the Light of the British Telecom Judgment,
23 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 39, 48 (1986). It is not clear if a State, with regard to its
19871
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the limits posed by article 90 of the Treaty) have also qualified as
"undertakings" within the meaning of article 85.
The decisions of the ECJ also shade some light on the meaning of
the term "enterprise." In this respect it has been held that article 85
does not apply to the relations between a parent and a subsidiary
company which, "although having a separate legal personality, enjoys
no economic independence.' '23
Both the ECJ and the Commission have construed very broadly the
terms "agreement, decision by association of undertakings and concerted
practices." Thus, it has been said that not only contracts binding under
the national law of the parties but also non-binding agreements 26 or
simple understandings 27 may violate the provisions of article 85.
The meaning of the term "decisions by associations of undertakings"
may seem to be equivalent to "concerted practices." There are, however,
some differences. As has been pointed out, "A concerted practice in-
volves an intentional coordination of market behavior . . . while a
decision may have anti-competitive effects without there being any in-
tentional horizontal agreement or understanding. "21
The first important case in which the Court attempted to define a
concerted practice was ICI v. Commission,29 one of the so-called Dyes-
tuffs cases. On that occasion the Court inferred the existence of a
concerted practice from a variety of evidence, including the concordance
of the rate and timing of the price increase made by the challenged
companies and the existence of previous informal contacts between them.
At the same time the Court clarified the distinction between a concerted
practice and an agreement, holding that a concerted practice is a "form
of co-ordination between undertakings which, without going so far as
to amount to an agreement properly so called, knowingly substitutes a
practical co-operation between them for the risks of competition." 30
legislative power, is also subject to the provisions of article 85. See Association des Centres
Distributeurs Edouard Leclerc v. Au Ble Vert (Case 229/83) [19851 2 C.M.L.R. 286, and
Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, by the Commission of the European Community
93 (1986).
25. Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA (Case 22/71) [1971] E.C.R. 949,
[19721 C.M.L.R. 81; see also Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. (Case 15/74) [19741
E.C.R. 1147, [19741 2 C.M.L.R. 480. On point also is Re Kodak, 13 O.J. Comm. Eur.
(No. L 147) 24 (1970), [19701 C.M.L.R. D19.
26. FEDETAB v. Commission (Cases 209-15/78 and 218/78) [1980] E.C.R. 3125;
[19811 3 C.M.L.R. 134.
27. Community v. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. 25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 354)
28 (1982), [19831 1 C.M.L.R. 497.
28. R. Whish, Competition Law 169 (1985).
29. [1972] E.C.R. 619, [19721 2 C.M.L.R. 557.
30. Id. at 622.
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In a subsequent case" the Court went further, stating that it is not
necessary that an actual plan has been worked out between the parties
to prove the existence of a concerted practice. This rule, however,
generally does not apply in those cases in which the behavior of a firm
has been determined not by the desire of establishing a concerted practice,
but by the fact that the ladopted behavior was the only reasonable
reaction to the prevailing market conditions. 32 In fact, the Court has
been increasingly careful in evaluating the evidence of the existence of
concerted practices submitted by the Commission. 3  In certain cases,
however, notably in the presence of unilateral behavior such as the
avoidance of export to certain markets3 4 or the refusal to supply certain
dealers,35 the Court has been ready to consider as a concerted practice
activity that may well be a reasonable response to certain market con-
ditions. 36
The prohibition of article 85 reaches the conclusion of agreements
"which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition. 3 7 However, only those agreements "which
may affect trade between Member States"3 are subject to the prohi-
bitions of article 85, a limitation which applies no matter what the
degree of impact an agreement may have on competition. The require-
ment of an effect on trade between the Member States has been defined
as "the boundary between the areas respectively covered by Community
law and the law of the member-States." 3 9 Still, both the Court and the
Commission have given a broad construction to this requirement, con-
sidering it satisfied when the agreement in question may have an influ-
ence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade
between the Member StatesA° Thus, that an agreement involves only
one nation does not mean that it may not somehow be subject to the
proscriptions of article 85.
31. Suiker Unie v. Commission (Cases 40-48/73, 50/73, 54-56/73, 111/73, 113-14/
73) [1975 E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295, 425.
32. See id. and Zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG (Case 172/80) [1981] E.C.R.
2021, [1982) 1 C.M.L.R. 313.
33. Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA v. Commission (Cases 29-30/83)
[1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
34. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission (Case 86/82) [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 559.
35. AEG-Telefunken v. Commission (Case 107/82) [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 325.
36. For the harm that such a broad interpretation of the principle of "concerted
practices" may cause, see Korah, Concerted Practices, 36 Mod. L. Rev. 220 (1973).
37. EEC Treaty art. 85.
38. EEC Treaty art. 85.
39. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission (Case 22/78) [1979] E.C.R. 1865, [1979]
3 C.M.L.R. 345, 373.
40. La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm (Case 56/65) [1966] E.C.R. 235,
[19661 C.M.L.R. 357, 375.
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This principle was first set forth by the Court in the Grundig case. 41
Grundig had granted an exclusive license to Consten, a French company,
to market its products in France. In order to protect this licensee,
Grundig forbade its other licensees from exporting its products to France
and also allowed Consten to register in France under its name the trade
mark GINT (Grundig Int'l). When another French firm, Unef, started
to sell in France at a lower price than Consten some Grundig products
it had imported from Germany, Consten sued Unef for unfair com-
petition and trademark infringement. The ECJ, deciding the case upon
the request of a French court, rejected the allegations, reasoning that:
In the present case, the contract between Grundig and Consten,
on the one hand by preventing undertakings other than Consten
importing Grundig products into France, and on the other hand
by prohibiting Consten from re-exporting those products to other
countries of the Common Market, indisputably affects trade
between member-States.4 2
In the same case the Court also ruled that "the fact that an agreement
favours an increase, even a large one, in the volume of trade between
[Member] States, is not sufficient to exclude the ability of the agreement
to 'affect' the trade in the above-mentioned direction." '43
In the CementhandeLaren case, 44 where the defendants tried to dis-
tinguish Grundig on the basis that the challenged agreement did not
concern exports, the Court went further, dismissing the defense because
"[a]n agreement extending over the whole of the territory of a member-
State has, by its very nature, the effect of consolidating a national
partitioning, thus hindering the economic interpenetration to which the
Treaty is directed." ' 4
Article 85 may also apply to agreements pertaining to trade outside
the Common Market if the agreement is limited to imports, 46 or if,
although primarily or even completely involving exports, the agreement
has the side effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition
within the EEC. Thus, in the Commercial Solvents47 case, the Court
41. Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission (Cases 56/64, 58/64) [19661 E.C.R. 299,
[1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
42. [1966] C.M.L.R. at 472.
43. Id.
44. Vereeniging van CementhandeLaren v. Commission (Case 8/72) [1972] E.C.R.
977, [1973] C.M.L.R. 7. See also Salonia v. Poidomani (Case 126/80) [1981] E.C.R.
1563, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 64.
45. CementhandeLaren, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 21.
46. Re Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement, 17 O.J. Comm. Eur. (No. L 343)
19 (1974), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D8.
47. Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission (Cases 6-7/73) [1974] E.C.R. 223,
[1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309.
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rejected the defense that 90% of the defendant's production was exported
outside the EEC. In so holding, the Court declared that it was bound
to consider every effect "of the conduct complained [of,] . . . [no]
matter whether the conduct relates to . . . exports or trade within the
Common Market[,] once it has been established that . . . [it] will have
repercussions on the competitive structure within the Common Market. '48
On the other hand, with respect to the effect of a foreign firm's
behavior in the Common Market, the Commission seems to have adopted49
the "effect doctrine," under which "an agreement, wherever made, that
may reasonably be expected to have substantial effects in the common
market infringes Article 85(1)."1 0
The mischief addressed by article 85 is the "prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the Common Market. '51 This pro-
vision covers not only the effective but also the merely intended re-
striction of competition. Citing this principle, the Court has held 52 that
the words, "object or effect" (of distorting competition) have to be
read disjunctively, and that, only if it is not clear that the purpose of
an agreement is to restrict competition, then the consequences of the
agreement should be considered.55 In considering the effects of an agree-
ment, it is sufficient for purposes of triggering application of article 85
that the impact of those effects is solely on third parties.5 4 Furthermore,
the prohibition of article 85 does not only extend to actual distortions
of competition, but will also reach reasonably expected potential dis-
tortions.5 However, in judging whether an agreement potentially may
have an impact on the trade between Member States or may distort
competition, its weight must be evaluated with respect to "the economic
and legal context in which such agreements ... are to be found." '56
Relying upon this rule in Voick v. Vervaecke,57 the Court held that an
agreement between parties which control only a negligible share of the
48. 1 C.M.L.R. at 342.
49. Woodpulp, 28 O.J. Comm. Eur. (No. L 85) 1 (1985), [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 474.
The appeals to the ECJ, Cases 89/85 and 142/85, are still pending.
50. V. Korah, An Introductory Guide to EEC Competition Law and Practice 29 (3d
ed. 1986).
51. EEC Treaty art. 85.
52. La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm (Case 56/65) [1966] E.C.R. 235,
[1966] C.M.L.R. 357; contra Gleiss-Hirsch, Common Market Cartel Law 62 (3d ed. 1981).
53. La Technique Miniere, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 375-76.
54. See Italy v. Council and Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 389, [1969] C.M.L.R. 39.
55. Re Vacum Interrupters Ltd., 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 48) 32 (1977), [1977]
1 C.M.L.R. D67.
56. Brasserie de Haecht v. Vilkins (Case 23/67) [1967] E.C.R. 407, [1968] C.M.L.R.
26, 40.
57. (Case 5/69) [1969] E.C.R. 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273. See also Cadillon v. Hoss
(Case 1/71) [1971] E.C.R. 351, [1971] C.M.L.R. 420.
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market (in this case between 0.2 and 0.050) is not covered by article
85, due to the economic weakness of the parties.
Since the Court never indicated the exact share of the market under
which the rule set forth in Voick (the "de minimis rule") was to be
applied, the Commission issued the so-called Notice on Minor Agree-
ments,5" which in its current form 9 exempts from the prohibitions of
article 85 those agreements which, in spite of their being distortive of
competition, affect no more than 5% of the market and whose partic-
ipants have an aggregate turnover not exceeding 50 million ECU.60 Proper
understanding of this Notice requires further elaboration.
First, a firm may not escape the provisions of article 85 by entering
into a number of contracts which, if taken singularly, would fall within
the exemption created by the Notice, but which, if considered "as a
whole[,] are such as to restrict the freedom of trade. ' '6 In the Brasserie
de Haecht case, for example, a Belgian beer producer had entered into
several contracts with different owners of cafes. Under one of those
contracts the plaintiff had consented to buy exclusively from Brasserie
all the beverages required for his cafe for a period equal to the duration
of a loan Brasserie had made to him. In a preliminary ruling, the Court
found that, in spite of Brasserie's control of only a tiny share of the
market, the agreement could be found incompatible with article 85, since
those kinds of contracts were highly common in Belgium and had
conferred on the beer producers a sort of monopoly.62
Secondly, a large company cannot invoke the de minimis rule on
the basis of the narrow share of the market it controls with respect to
a single product. 63 It also must be pointed out that "the Notice (on
Minor Agreements) ... was issued for guidance only and . . . it has
not legal effect."' 64 Thus, the Court is not bound by the Notice, but
may consider it as "a mitigating factor ... when imposing fines on an
undertaking which has relied upon it. ' '61
One final point concerning section one of article 85 deserves mention.
On one hand the reach of article 85 is broader than it appears, because
the enumeration of restrictive practices contained in section one is not
58. Notice on Minor Agreements, OJ [1970] C 64/1.
59. As amended Dec. 29, 1977, OJ [1977] C 313/3.
60. European Currency Units. (A monetary unit not actually in circulation but referred
to in the official acts of the EEC and whose value is based on the value of a "basket"
of the currencies of the member states of the EEC.)
61. Brasserie de Haecht, [1968] C.M.L.R. at 40.
62. See id. at 26, 38-41.
63. Distillers Co. v. Commission (Case 30/78) [1980] E.C.R. 2229, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R.
121.
64. Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission (Case 19/77) [1978] E.C.R. 131,
[1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 334, 342 (Opinion of Advocat-General Warner).
65. V. Korah, supra note 50, at 29.
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all-inclusive, 66 for, as has been pointed out, "[tihe wording 'in particular'
itself shows that the enumeration is not exhaustive .... Thus it is not
relevant if one does not succeed in classifying a given case under one
of the examples ... [so long as] the general elements of the prohibition
are satisfied. '67 On the other hand, there are certain areas of the
economy which article 85 (as well as article 86) do not regulate, such
as coal and steel undertakings, 6 nuclear energy,6 9 agriculture, 70 trans-
ports, 7' and, to some extent, the public sector. 72
Sections Two and Three
With respect to the two other sections of article 85, section two
expressly declares void all agreements made in violation of section one,
while section three provides the possibility of an exemption from those
sanctions .71
In order to obtain the said exemption the agreement must satisfy
four conditions: (a) contribution to the improvement of the production
or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic
progress; (b) allocation to consumers of a fair share of the benefit; (c)
avoidance of unnecessary restrictions; and (d) less than complete elim-
ination of competition "in respect of a substantial part of the products
in question." As a general remark it must be remembered that pursuant
to article 9 (1) Regulation 17/62, the Commission is the only authority
which has the power to grant an exemption, though its decisions may
be reviewed on appeal by the ECJ. In that case the burden of proving
that all four conditions to obtaining an exemption have been met lies
with the undertaking. What follows is a brief overview of particular
aspects of the four conditions.
(a) Two decisions in particular by the Commission illustrate the
application of this first condition. 74 In Re Rockwell-Iveco Agreement,7
the Commission granted the exemption for an agreement for the creation
66. See supra note 9.
67. Gleiss-Hirsch, supra note 52, at 92.
68. To which applies the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty.
69. To which applies the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), March 25, 1957, Belgium-Germany-France-Italy-Luxembourg-Netherlands
No. 4301, 298 U.N.T.S. 169.
70. See EEC Treaty arts. 38-47.
71. See EEC Council Regs. 141/62, 1017/68.
72. See EEC Treaty art. 90 and supra note 24.
73. EEC Treaty art. 85, §§ 1-3.
74. In Re United Processor GmbH, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 51) 7 (1976), [1976]
2 C.M.L.R. Dl, the exemption was granted because there was a chance that the conditions
to grant it, although not present at the moment, were going to materialize in the future.
75. 26 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 224) 19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 709.
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of a joint venture between an axle manufacturer and a truck manu-
facturer, which created "a rationalization of production [and] contributed
to increase technical progress in the goods concerned." 76 In Re De Laval-
Stork VOF,77 the Commission granted the exemption for an agreement
between an American and a Dutch turbine producer, observing that
"the agreement prevents the creation of uneconomic capacity [and] has
a decisive influence on costs by providing ... that the jointly-owned
plant will be able to . .. reduce the large proportion of the total costs
represented by fixed costs. 78
(b) For the purposes of this provision, it has been held that other
enterprises which use a particular product in the course of their trade
may qualify as "consumers. '79 In some instances the Commission has
refused to grant the exemption based on a finding that the agreement
failed to yield a fair share to consumers. Thus, in Re VBBB/VBVB
AgreementO it struck down a resale price agreement between two as-
sociations of Dutch language book sellers because the agreement would
have deprived the consumers of the chance of obtaining a discount."
Again, in Re VNP and COPELBA12 the Commission refused to grant
an exemption for an agreement between two paper producers to exchange
statistics of production. The exchange was deemed to be aimed at giving
information about which products sold best, and hence designed for the
"creation of a market situation ... for the sole benefit of the producer
and not of the consumer." 83
(c) In some cases the Commission has granted an exemption for
agreements which, though they may restrict competition, have a beneficial
effect on the market as proven by a "competitive weight analysis.
' '
1
4
In a recent case 81 the Court suggested that certain agreements to restrain
competition, using as an example franchise agreements, may be granted
an exemption in the interest of preventing competitors from taking
advantage of the expertise and assistance that one party (in this case
the franchisor) supplies to the other (its franchisee).
76. 3 C.M.L.R. at 720.
77. 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 215) 11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. D69.
78. 2 C.M.L.R. at D81.
79. See Re ACEC/Berliet Agreements, 11 O.J. Comm. Eur. (No. L 201) 7 (1968),
[1968] C.M.L.R. D35.
80. 25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 54) 36 (1982), [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 344.
81. 2 C.M.L.R. at 364.
82. 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 242) 10 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. D28.
83. 2 C.M.L.R. at D39-40.
84. See Re De Laval-Stork VOF Joint Venture, 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 215)
11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. D69; Re United Processor Gmbh, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm.
(No. L 51) 7 (1976), [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. Dl.
85. Pronuptia de Paris v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis (Case 161/84) [1986]
1 C.M.L.R. 414, 443.
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(d) When the agreement totally eliminates competition the Com-
mission will not grant the exemption. Thus, in FEDETAB v. Commission6
the Court held that an agreement between a few Belgian cigarette pro-
ducers which controlled 80% of the market completely excluded com-
petition and could not be granted an exemption. However, when the
product market is not well-defined and thus it is uncertain whether
competition will be completely restricted, the Court has taken a more
liberal approach, reversing the Commission's decisions refusing the ex-
emption.17 On the other hand, both the Court and the Commission have
interpreted broadly the requisite of distortion of competition "within
the Common Market." In Ford Werke AG v. Commission (II),s s for
example, the German subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company refused
to supply its German dealers with right-hand drive cars in order to
protect its dealers in the United Kingdom, who, due to exchange rate
fluctuation, had difficulty competing with their German counterparts.
The Commission declined to renew the exemption it had previously
granted Ford, since the refusal to supply the cars tended to insulate the
English market from competition. On appeal, the ECJ affirmed the
Commission's decision on the ground that "the Commission ... was
obliged to take account of all the circumstances surrounding the ap-
plication of that agreement and . . . thus ... [took] the view that the
mere refusal to supply German dealers with right-hand drive cars suitable
for export was a key element in partitioning the Common Market
artificially." 8 9
Finally, it must be pointed out that alongside with the individual
exemptions already examined, there is the chance for certain kinds of
agreements, relating to particular business sectors, to be automatically
exempted without any notification to the Commission (which is required
for individual agreements) pursuant to certain Council Regulations. 9°
Section One of the Sherman Act
As has been pointed out, Section One of the Sherman Act, although
similar to article 85, is expressed in broader terms. In fact, it applies
to any "contract ... combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade among the several States, or with foreign nations." 91
As far as the number of participants to the unlawful action is
concerned, Section One, like article 85, only forbids activities performed
86. [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 134.
87. See, e.g., Kali & Salz AG v. Commission (Cases 19-20/74) [1975] E.C.R. 499,
(1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 154.
88. (Cases 25-26/84) [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 528.
89. Id. at 546.
90. See EEC Council Regs. 1983/83, 1984/83, 2394/84, 123/85, 417/85.
91. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1982).
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by two or more persons or entities. In the EEC it has long been settled
that wholly owned subsidiaries are not to be considered independent for
the purposes of antitrust provisions.92 In the United States, however,
until the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.,91 the rule, first laid down in United States
v. Yellow Cab Co.,94 was that there might be an unlawful conspiracy
between a parent and its subsidiary because "the fact of common
ownership [could not] save them from any of the obligations that the
law imposes on separate entities." 95 The Supreme Court, after an attempt
to distinguish substance from form in National Dairy Products Corp.
v. United States,96 expressly overruled Yellow Cab in Copperweld, stating
that "the very notion of agreement in Sherman Act terms between a
parent and wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning. ' 97 The Court stressed
that, "in reality, a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have
a 'unity of purpose or a common design,"' 98 a view held by the ECJ
as well. Finally it must be pointed out that the Supreme Court and the
ECJ share the same approach of holding liable under the antitrust
statutes an association and its members who voluntarily follow the illegal
practices agreed upon by all the members of the association.99
Focusing now on the other elements of the activity proscribed by
Section One, it is worth notice that the Supreme Court has construed
the term "contract" to mean a binding agreement either express or
implied.100 The Court, however, has been liberal in considering the
meaning of the term "agreement." Thus, in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,"°" an agency arrangement between a manufacturer and
its distributors was held to be an agreement within the meaning of
Section One.
Some differences between the interpretations of Section One and
article 85 arise with respect to the application of the provision concerning
"combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." The American courts
have in fact been stricter than the ECJ in recognizing the existence of
92. See text accompanying supra note 25.
93. 467 U.S. 752, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
94. 332 U.S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1560 (1947).
95. Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1986 (1968).
96. 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883, 86
S. Ct. 1913 (1966). See also Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 451 (1983).
97. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
98. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2742 (emphasis in original).
99. See Rosenbrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n., 666 F.2d
1130, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111, 105 S. Ct. 385, and compare
it with IAZ Int'l. Belgium BV v. Commission, (Case 96/82) [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 276.
100. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150 (1922).
101. 388 U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct. 1856 (1967).
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a combination or conspiracy, for they have always required clear and
convincing evidence of conscious parallelism in economic behavior, while
the latter has been satisfied with a lesser degree of proof, at least in
the presence of parallel behavior.10 2
As far as the proof of the intent to restrict trade is concerned, the
Supreme Court seems in recent decisions to have, in certain respects,
moved in the opposite direction than the ECJ. Until 1978 the general
principle was that the intent to act in concerted restraint of trade, being
a general intent, did not have to be proven directly, but could be
inferred from the defendant's having engaged in a concerted action
directed to restrain trade, or even from the fact that "a restraint or
monopoly [had] result[ed] as a consequence of the defendant's con-
duct."' 03 This well-established principle, consistent with the so-called La
Technique Miniere test followed by the ECJ,' °4 remained apparently
unchanged by the Act in 1974 which upgraded violations of the Sherman
Act from misdemeanors to felonies, 0 5 even though such a change would
seem to require a higher degree of proof of criminal intent before
conviction in order to be consistent with the general principles of criminal
law. The Supreme Court did, however, eventually restore a certain degree
of consistency with the rules of criminal -procedure by introducing, in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,16 a prohibition against
"reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an
effect on prices" 07 ; at the same time, however, the Court noted that
this analysis "focuses solely on the elements of a criminal offense ...
and leaves unchanged the general rule [pertaining to] a civil violation." 0 8
In addition to showing the requisite intent, the existence of an actual
agreement must be proven for there to be a violation of Section One.
Of course, when there is no direct proof of the agreement, this may
be shown by indirect evidence.
As briefly noted above, American courts have been reluctant to
infer the existence of an actual agreement"° simply from consciously
parallel conduct without additional facts. As it has been said,
102. The distinction between "combination" and "conspiracy" has never been clear,
and the latest decision of the Supreme Court which hinted to the problem seems to have
completely blurred any distinction between the two terms. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42, 88 S. Ct. 1981, 1986 (1984). See also
text accompanying supra note 95.
103. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610, 92 S. Ct. 1126,
1135 (1972).
104. (Case 56/65) [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (as amended in 1976).
106. 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. 2865 (1978).
107. Id. at 435, 98 S. Ct. at 2872.
108. Id. at 436 n.13, 98 S. Ct. at 2873 n.13.
109. Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-
41, 74 S. Ct. 257, 259-60 (1954).
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Conscious parallelism . . . always assumes whatever significance
it might have from additional facts. Thus, conscious parallelism
is not even evidence of agreement unless there are some other
facts indicating that the decision of the alleged conspirators were
interdependent [and] consistent with the individual self-interest
. . , only if they all decided the same way. 1 0
Again, the courts seem to be concerned with the "protection" of
defendants from the criminal sanctions which may be inflicted upon
them in cases in which "reasonable inference drawing degenerates into
groundless speculation.""' Thus, in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distributing Corp."2 the Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals, which had found that the simple refusal
to supply suburban theaters with first-run movies was based on sound
business reasons and did not amount to a violation of Section One. In
so holding, the Court stated that it had "never held that proof of a
parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased
differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act of-
fense."" 3
Several years earlier," 4 the Supreme Court had identified some of
the factors required, in addition to parallel behavior, to support a finding
of concerted activity. The most important and most widely followed by
the courts" 5 are: (1) the existence of a common motive to enter into
the agreement; (2) the failure to explain the parallel behavior as a rational
response to market conditions; and (3) the knowledge that the concerted
action was contemplated or sought by the other participants to the
challenged scheme. In a more recent decision reaffirming these principles,
the Supreme Court further specified that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show that there is evidence which "tends to exclude the
possibility that the [defendant] was acting independently."" 6
110. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Par-
allelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 658 (1962). See also Note, Conscious
Parrallelism: The Business Judgment Defense in a Summary Judgment Context, 35 Hastings
L. J. 115 (1983).
111. In Re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-trust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 303-04 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1984).
112. 346 U.S. 537, 74 S. Ct. 257 (1954).
113. Id. at 541, 74 S. Ct. at 259.
114. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-25, 59 S. Ct. 467,
472-74 (1939).
115. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Paul
Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983); Schoenkopf v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 637 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1980); Montana v. Superamerica, 559
F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1983).
116. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S. Ct. 1464,
1471 (1984).
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Finally, it should be noted that Section One, unlike article 85, does
not provide a list, even a restricted one, of prohibited practices, but
leaves to the courts the task of identifying them. An examination of
the specific practices declared unlawful under Section One goes beyond
the scope of this article. However, a comparative account of the general
principle which leads the courts in their interpretation of the American
antitrust statutes will be given in the last section of this work. ' 7
III. ARTICLE 86 EEC TREATY AND SECTION 2 SHERMAN ACT
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "[a]ny abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it ... in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."" 8 It then provides an illustrative list of un-
lawful practices, such as unfair or discriminatory pricing or imposing
supplementary obligations for the conclusion of a contract." 9
The terms "undertaking" and "interstate trade" have received the
same interpretation as under article 85. More troublesome, however, has
been the interpretation of the term "dominant position." The analysis
of both the ECJ and the Commission in this regard has focused on
three fundamental issues: (a) the definition of the product market; (b)
the definition of the geographic market; and (c) the degree of economic
power enjoyed by one or more firms (in the case of a shared monopoly
or oligopoly) within the said market.
The Product Market
In order to determine the existence of a dominant position it is
necessary to define the product market in which the alleged dominant
position is held. Although the ECJ has not given a clear test by which
to determine a relevant product market, it seems inclined to use the
interchangeability of products as a guideline. Thus, in an early case' 20
in which the issue pertained to the alleged monopolization of the market
of light metal cans for preserved meat, fish and the canning industry,
the Court quashed the imposition of sanctions by the Commission,
117. See text accompanying supra notes 171-204.
118. EEC Treaty art. 86.
119. Korah, Interpretation and Application of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome: Abuse
of a Dominant Position within the Common Market, 53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 768, 769
(1978).
120. Continental Can Co. v. Commission (Case 6/72) [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973]
C.M.L.R. 199.
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because it found absent proof "that competitors in other fields in the
market for light metal containers cannot, by a mere adaptation, enter
this market with sufficient strength to form a serious counterweight."' 2 1
Some years later, in United Brands Co. v. Commission, 22 the Court,
upholding the decision of the Commission, found that the market con-
cerned (for bananas) was separate from the markets for similar goods
(other fruits) because it was "singled out by special features distinguishing
it from other [markets] . . . [and] only to a limited extent interchangeable
with [the other goods] ... [and was therefore] exposed to their com-
petition in a way that is hardly perceptible."'12
The "interchangeability test," however, may prove inadequate in
the situation where a good has more than one use, thus being at the
same time part of two markets. In the only case in which the Court
has been called upon to apply the interchangeability test to such a
situation, it did not give a clear answer. In Hoffman-La Roche v.
Commission, 24 Hoffman-La Roche (HLR) raised as a defense to the
charge of having monopolized the vitamin market the fact that certain
vitamins may be used for industrial purposes as antioxidants.' 25 The
Court, probably because of the inadequacy of the interchangeability test,
preferred to rely on other aspects of the case to confirm the decision
of the Commission, and thus avoided deciding whether the dominant
position of HLR had to be tested against the market of vitamins for
pharmacological use or the one for industrial use.
The Geographic Market
As with the product market, the need for a clear definition of the
geographical market arises from the words "a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it."
In the Suiker Unie case 26 the Court held that for this purpose it
is necessary to take into account the geographic area in which the product
121. [1973] C.M.L.R. at 227.
122. (Case 27/76) [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
123. [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 482-83. See also the decision of the Court in Commercial
Solvents (Case 6-7/73) [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309, where, in order to
determine the relevant market for a pharmaceutical raw material, it applied a test aimed
at verifying whether there was on the market "a raw material which could [have] be[en]
substituted without difficulty for nitropropane," the material whose supply had been
ceased. [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 338.
124. (Case 85/76) [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
125. [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 271. See also L'Oreal NV v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K. Pvba
(Case 31/80) [1980] E.C.R. 3775, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235 and NV Nederlandsche Banden-
Industrie Michelin v. Commission (Case 322/81) [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R.
282.
126. Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
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is marketed and the incidence of the product within the Community as
a whole. In the Michelin case1 27 the Court upheld the decision of the
Commission which limited the geographic market for that case to only
Holland, justifying its ruling on the ground that the proceedings were
only directed toward the Dutch subsidiary of Michelin.
Degree of Economic Power
In order to assess the existence of a dominant position after having
defined the relevant market, it is necessary to measure the degree of
economic power the alleged dominant undertaking enjoys within that
market. To this effect, the Court has defined the degree of economic
power sufficient to trigger application of article 86 (i.e., a monopoly
position) as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition ... by giving it the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its compet-
itors, customers and ultimately of its consumers." 128
In determining whether there exists the material power to "behave
independently," the Court has considered a number of factors. One of
those is the market share possessed by the undertaking in question. The.
Court affirmed this principle in the HLR case when it said: "An
undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for some
time ... is by virtue of that share in a position of strength . .. [;]
although the importance of the market shares may vary from one market
to another . . . very large shares are in themselves, and save exceptional
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position."''
29
There are, however, other factors which the Court has taken into
account to assess dominance. In the United Brands case the vertical
integration of the company and an effective advertising campaign were
believed to have established a substantial advantage over competitors, 30
while in other cases a particular expertise,' 3' an extensive and efficient
sales network'3 2 and an industrial property right'33 were considered rel-
evant indicia of the existence of monopoly power.
3 4
127. Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
128. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 227, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 486-87.
129. Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] E.C.R. at 521, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275.
130. [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
131. Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
132. HLR, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [19791 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
133. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission (Case 22/78) [1979] E.C.R. 1865, [1979]
3 C.M.L.R. 345, 373.
134. See also General Motors Continental NV v. Commission (Case 26/75) [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 95. For a general overview of the problem, see Gyselen and Kyriazis, Article
86 EEC: The Monopoly Power Measurement Issue Revisited, 11 Eur. L. Rev. 134 (1986).
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Unlawful Practices by an Undertaking in a Dominant Position
The list of practices by an undertaking in a dominant position which
article 86 deems abusive is not exhaustive. It is however, possible to
classify them into two main categories, namely, actions which harm
competition in the Common Market in general, and actions which are
unfair towards users of the product or final consumers.'35
The Court has clearly stated that mergers can be regarded as unlawful
under the first category. Thus, in the Continental Can case,136 in ruling
on the lawfulness of the acquisition by a subsidiary of Continental Can
of two European packaging companies with a substantial share of the
market, the Court stated that "it cannot be supposed that the Treaty
... intended in article 86 to permit undertakings, by merging into an
organic unit, to obtain such a dominant position that any serious pos-
sibility of competition is almost eliminated."' 37 Furthermore, it is not
necessary that there be an actual exploitation of the market, for all that
is needed is "a substantial change in the supply structure seriously
jeopardizing the consumer's freedom of action." ' Finally, it must be
pointed out that among the other types of conduct which have been
condemned by the Court under this category are exclusive supply
agreements3  and the providing of loyalty rebates. 40
Turning to the second of the general categories of actions which
violate article 86, the most striking example is that of unfair price
practices. Such behavior may take the form of either very low pricing,
entered into with the intent of driving the competition out of the
market,' 4' or very high pricing, which takes place when there is "no
reasonable relation [between the price and] the economic value of the
product supplied.' ' 42
Another kind of behavior which has been condemned by the Court
as unfair is the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions within
135. A third category of abuse, namely unlawful acts of economic reprisal against
firms, has been construed in Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of "Abuse" of a
Dominant Position Under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 345 (1979).
136. [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199.
137. [19731 C.M.L.R. at 224.
138. Id. at 225.
139. HLR, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
140. Id.; See also Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
141. With respect to the inevitable losses ensuing from such a practice, the Court has
observed that "temporary improfitability or even losses are not inconsistent with the
existence of a dominant position." Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. at 3511, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 328. See also Re AKZO, Commission Decision of 14 December 1985, 28 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 374) 22 (1985).
142. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 301, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 502.
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contracts. Thus, in the SABAM case, 43 the issue was presented as to
whether the Belgian Society of Authors had abused its dominant position
by requiring its members, in consideration of protection given to them,
to assign to itself all future copyrights. The Court found that the
imposition upon its members, by "an undertaking entrusted with the
exploitation of copyrights and occupying a dominant position, [of] ob-
ligations ... not absolutely necessary for the attainment of its object
and which thus encroach unfairly upon a member's freedom to exercise
his copyright, can constitute an abuse."' 44 It may be useful to recall
that this kind of unlawful behavior may be engaged in by a buyer as
well as a seller, 45 and may also include discriminatory pricing, insofar
as market conditions do not justify such a course of action, i.e., when
there are not purely economic reasons behind the discriminatory practice,
but only a plan to influence the market. 46
Miscellaneous
A final remark is necessary regarding the provision which extends
the reach of article 86 to "more undertakings." It is not clear what is
meant by more than one undertaking, and the Court has stated that
this provision does not apply to oligopolies where "courses of conduct
interact, while in the case of an undertaking occupying a dominant
position the conduct of [such an] undertaking ... is to a great extent
determined unilaterally.'
' 47
Section Two of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act, like its European counterpart, does not leave
unregulated as important a threat to competition as that posed by
monopolies. Section Two thus condemns "[elvery person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce
among the several States or with foreign Nations.'
' 4
Section Two does not delineate any further the concept of mono-
polization, leaving its interpretation to the courts. In ascertaining the
existence of a monopoly, American courts have used the same "three
step" analysis 49 which is employed on the other side of the Atlantic:
143. BRT v. SABAM (Case 127/73) [1974] E.C.R. 51 (BRT-I) & 313 (BRT-II), [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. 238 & 269.
144. [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 284.
145. See Re Eurofima, [1973] C.M.L.R. D217.
146. United Brands (Case 27/76) 11978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
147. Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] E.C;R. at 520, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
149. See generally Spivack, Monopolization under the Sherman Act, Section 2, 50
Antitrust L.J. 285 (1982).
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first, the relevant market is defined, with respect to the product as well
as to geographic elements; then the power of the subject in that market
is assessed. In addition, American courts must also identify the existence
of an "intent to monopolize," as required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the activity proscribed by Section Two.
The Product Market
In defining the relevant product market, the Supreme Court has
adopted a "reasonable interchangeability" standard substantially equal
to the one used by the ECJ. The analysis was laid down in United
States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours,50 in which the Court was faced
with deciding whether its inquiry into the defendant's alleged monopoly
was to be made with respect to the market for cellophane or a larger
one which included all flexible packaging materials. The Court reasoned
that, "[iun considering what is the relevant market . . . no more definite
rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purpose make up that 'part of the trade or
commerce,' monopolization of which may be illegal. '1 5' The Court
further explained that the term "purpose" encompassed "price, use and
quality.'1 2 In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,' 53 the Supreme Court,
called to decide upon an alleged monopolization in the field of burglary
and fire protection services, went further, stating that there is "no barrier
to combining in a single market a number of different products or
services where that combination reflects commercial realities.''
Further analysis of the reasonable interchangeability standard reveals
the use of three different criteria. 55
The first criterion is based on the capacity of different products to
perform the same function. Thus, in United States v. Continental Can
Co.,56 the Supreme Court held that cans and bottles were parts of the
same market, for both were used as containers. When this position is
compared with the one taken by the ECJ, it appears that the latter
court has sometimes followed a narrower standard in defining the rel-
evant market, although in theory it has used the same general principle.'57
The second criterion is based on the extent to which customers react
to a change in price of a product by substituting it with another one.
150. 351 U.S. 377, 76 S. Ct. 994 (1956).
151. Id. at 395, 76 S. Ct. at 1007.
152. Id. at 404, 76 S. Ct. at 1012.
153. 384 U.S. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698 (1966).
154. Id. at 572, 86 S. Ct. at 1704.
155. See 2 E. Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law 330 (1980).
156. 378 U.S. 441, 84 S. Ct. 1738 (1964).
157. See text accompanying supra notes 120-25.
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In Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp.,'" the plaintiff alleged a
monopolization by IBM of the market for the leasing of computers.
IBM argued in defense that leasing is only a way of financing the sale
of a computer, and that therefore it was involved only in the market
for the sale of computers. The court of appeals held, based on the
rationale that customers who lease a computer are different from those
who buy one, that the leasing and the sales market for computers are
different.
The third criterion concerns the ability of other manufacturers to
produce the same goods supplied by the alleged monopolist. A good
example may be found in the decision In Re Municipal Bond Reporting
Anti-trust litigation.1 9 In that case a suit brought for an alleged mon-
opolization of the information on the secondary market for bonds issued
by municipalities was dismissed because the court found that there were
"alternatives [which] . . .were reasonable substitutes for the defendant's
services."
160
The Geographic Market
The definition of the geographic market affected is unavoidably
related to that of the relevant product market. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the notion of a geographic market is flexible and
that its determination is related to the extent to which competition is
eliminated in a determinant area.'
6 1
Monopoly Power
Monopoly power has been defined by the Supreme Court as "the
power to control prices or to exclude competition."'' 62 The possession
of a large share of the market has been regarded as strong evidence of
the existence of such power, and, although the Supreme Court has
always refused to give a specific figure above which it is willing to draw
the existence of a monopoly, it is likely that the possession of a market
share of over 60-650o would suffice. 163
158. 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978).
159. 672 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 441-42.
161. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-59, 83 S. Ct. 1715,
1738-39 (1963); see also White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d
495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983).
162. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391, 76 S. Ct. at 1005.
163. See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co.: "[Ninety
percent] ... is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-
four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not." 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (sitting as court of last resort by certification of the Supreme Court).
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There are also other indicia from which the American courts have
found the existence of a monopoly. Among those are: the structure of
the market, the chances for other firms to enter it, the integration
between manufacturers and sellers, 164 and the existence of very high or
very low prices or frequent price changes. 165
Intent to Monopolize
As noted previously, there is another requirement which has to be
satisfied in order to trigger the application of Section Two. The courts
have required the existence of a specific intent to monopolize, as dis-
tinguished from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.' 1 66 This intent, however,
is often presumed, since "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing."' 167
There are only two ways in which this presumption can be escaped.
The first relies on the concept of the so-called natural monopoly, which
exists when the total output required can be most efficiently supplied
by only one producer.' 6 The second is based on the superior skill or
fair and successful use of competition by the defendant. To quote again
Judge Learned Hand from his opinion in the ALCOA case, "The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
down when he wins.' 69
Attempt and Conspiracy
The other provisions of Section Two prohibit the attempt to mo-
nopolize and the conspiracy or combination to monopolize. Although
these two offenses have some common features, the main one being
that in both cases the defendant(s) are still in a preparatory stage, there
are still some significant differences. With regard to the attempt to
monopolize, not only is the intent required, but also the existence of
164. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981).
165. Id. at 131.
166. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571, 86 S. Ct. at 1704.
167. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 432.
168. See American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th
Cir. 1963), where the fact that the defendant had been established long before the plaintiff
and had thus occupied most of the single-team cities was held not to be an unlawful
monopoly, for such a situation had developed only for natural and historical reasons and
not as a result of unfair practices.
169. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 430. See also Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660
F.2d 1275, 1282 (8th Cir. 1981), where the-court affirmed the District Court decision
that Monsanto had not monopolized the "turf" market and that its possession of a large
share of the market was justified by "the superiority of its product."
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a "dangerous probability"' 70 of succeeding. The conspiracy provision,
on the other hand, is triggered only by the action of the alleged col-
laborators.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
A detailed comparison of the specific practices prohibited by the
EEC and United States antitrust statutes is beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, it is useful to delineate the general interpretative
rules used by the courts of the United States in applying the Sherman
Act, for such an examination provides an opportunity for comparative
remarks relating to the general policies underlying the two antitrust
schemes.
Judicial Interpretation of the Sherman Act
As was noted before,' the American antitrust statutes are broadly
drawn and the legislator thus has left to the courts a wide power of
interpretation.
The development of this process seems to be oriented toward an
increasingly narrow construction of the statute. This orientation can be
traced as far back as the landmark Standard Oil case. Prior to that
case, and shortly after the enactment of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court held in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 72 that
the prohibitions of Section One extended to "every contract or com-
bination in restraint of trade . . . not limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade."' 73 Fourteen years
later in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White, after comparing the Sherman
Act's provisions with the classical common law rule, 174 concluded that
those provisions were to be applied only to those contracts or combi-
nations which create an unreasonable restraint of trade, a limitation
which has no specific expression in the statute.' 7' This principle, better
170. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 1127
(1946).
171. See text accompanying supra notes 18-19.
172. 166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540 (1897).
173. Id. at 328, 17 S. Ct. at 554. This principle was reaffirmed in United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25 (1898), and its reach extended, in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211, 20
S. Ct. 96 (1899), to firms not operating in a business subject to public regulation.
174. See supra notes I and 2 and accompanying text.
175. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911). This decision
followed an extensive debate on amending the Sherman Act to restrict its coverage only
to contracts which constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. An amendment, proposed
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known as the "rule of reason," imposes on the courts the task of
evaluating the impact of the challenged agreement on competition, by
taking into consideration factors such as the nature of the restraint'7 6
or the power over the market enjoyed by the defendant. 77
The rule set forth in Standard Oil received further elaboration in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.'7 1 In that case, the Court,
starting from the assumption that "every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains,' ' 79 concluded that "the true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition."'8 a0 Applying those principles, the
Court held that an agreement between the members of the Board of
Trade, which prohibited the purchase or sale of grain at a price different
from that fixed in the last trading session, was pro-competitive, because
it prevented the private bidding previously practiced. Thus, the agreement
allowed more dealers, who could not participate in such transactions
without an adequate knowledge of the market, to engage in the business.
The principles developed in the Board of Trade decision have been
utilized in a number of cases.'' More recently, however, the Supreme
Court has shown a willingness to take other factors into consideration
in determining the lawfulness of an agreement. Not only will the Court
examine the impact of the agreement on competition in general, but it
will also consider how it affects the consumers' position. 82 That is,
in 1909, which aimed to modify the Act in this sense was indefinitely postponed for the
fear not only of discrepancies in the Court's interpretation but also of a substantial
emasculation of the Act. It is not without significance that it was the future Chief Justice
White who wrote the dissenting opinion in the Trans-Missouri case.
176. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607, 92 S. Ct. 1125, 1133;
Ratino v. Medical Servs., 718 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1983); Sherman v. British
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 449 (9th Cir. 1979).
177. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137,
1143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023, 95 S. Ct. 500 (1974).
178. 246 U.S. 231, 38 S. Ct. 242 (1918).
179. Id. at 238, 38 S. Ct. at 244.
180. Id., 38 S. Ct. at 244.
181. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97
S. Ct. 2549 (1977); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76
S. Ct. 1698 (1956); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S. Ct.
471 (1933).
182. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), in
which the Court held unlawful a horizontal price agreement because the result would
have been unresponsive to consumers' preferences. See also Products Liability Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982) (The purpose of the
antitrust statutes is to "protect the consumer interest in competition."); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 349, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1979).
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while in the past the Court treated the antitrust statutes as mainly
serving to foster competition, on the assumption that such conduct would
eventually benefit the consumer, in more recent decisions it seems that
the focus has been placed directly on the consumer's welfare, with the
protection of competition considered as necessary only insofar as it
serves the consumer's interest. 3
The Per Se Rule
The "rule of reason" is not, however, the only guideline relied
upon by American courts in applying the Sherman Act. Alongside with
establishing the rule of reason in the Standard Oil case, 8 4 the Supreme
Court observed that there are certain agreements whose nature, character
and natural effects give rise to "a conclusive presumption which [brings]
them within the statute."' 8
The first clear formulation of this principle, better known as the
"per se rule," came in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 18 6 which
involved an alleged conspiracy to fix the price of sanitary pottery. The
Supreme Court, in dismissing the defendant's appeal, observed that
"[tihe aim and result of every price fixing agreement ... is the elim-
ination of one form of competition."'8 7 This principle was reaffirmed
some years later in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.' In that
case a few major oil companies had conspired to buy large quantities
of "distress" gasoline, thus creating a shortage which enabled them to
maintain their own fixed price for the product. Rejecting an appeal by
the defendants, the Supreme Court ruled that "a combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging
or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se.' 89
Under the "per se rule," then, when it has been proved that an
agreement belongs to one of certain categories of unlawful agreements,
there no room for application of the "rule of reason," and the agreement
is declared void without any further inquiry as to its effects on com-
petition. In deciding which kinds of agreements may give rise to the
183. See University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983),
where the court said that the significance of antitrust legislation is not "the preservation
of all existing competitors but the maintenance of a sufficient number to assure that
consumers get the best possible quality of product at the lowest possible price"; Products
Liability, 682 F.2d at 664, where the same court analyzed an insurance brokerage dispute
solely in the light of the protection of consumer benefits.
184. 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911).
185. Id. at 65, 31 S. Ct. at 518.
186. 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927).
187. Id. at 397, 47 S. Ct. at 379.
188. 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811 (1940).
189. Id. at 223, 60 S. Ct. at 844.
1987]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
irrebuttable presumption of unlawfulness, the courts will typically classify
as void "per se" those agreements whose benefits might have been
obtained without imposing the challenged restraint. Second, the pro-
pensity of an agreement toward creating a monopoly will also be con-
sidered.190
It should be noted that the "per se rule" seems to have been touched
by the movement toward a narrower interpretation of the antitrust
statutes.' 9' Some courts, for instance, have resorted to a solution which
combines the characteristics of both the "rule of reason" and the "per
se rule." This approach, also known as rule of "facial unreasonable-
ness," requires a case by case analysis of the necessity of applying the
"per se rule," instead of relying on fixed categories, and is based on
some Supreme Court decisions which seem to have "blurr[ed] . . . the
distinction between the rule of reason and the per se approaches."' 92
Comparative Observations
At first glance, a comparison of the American and EEC antitrust
statutes reveals some basic similarities. Indeed, the approach taken by
both the ECJ and the Commission has frequently involved application
of a number of principles which are in common with those followed
under the "rule of reason." For example, both the Supreme Court in
the Sylvania case' 93 and the ECJ in the Metro case 194 looked with favor
upon vertical restraints in the distribution process, which, although in
principle anti-competitive, do possess the pro-competitive quality of
strengthening inter-brand competition.
The similarities between the two statutes is limited, however, to
those kind of practical applications. Under the Sherman Act, once it
has been demonstrated that an agreement violates the prohibitions set
by the statute, it may be saved only if the benefit it gives to competition
offsets the harm. 9 Conversely, under the EEC approach, there is the
190. 1 E. Kintner, supra note 155, at 367-69. Those categories of agreements which
have been found unlawful per se include horizontal price fixing, division of market, resale
price maintenance, tying arrangements and group boycotts. See generally 2 E. Kintner,
supra note 55, at 57.
191. See NCAA v. Board of Regents 468 U.S. 85, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Broadcasting
Music, Co. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 155 (1979); Continental T.V. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
192. Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examination" of Restraints:
the Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 27
(1984).
193. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
194. MetroSB-Grossmarkte GmbH v. Commission (Case 26/76), [1977] E.C.R. 1875,
[1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
195. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688,
98 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 (1978), where the Supreme Court again said that "the Rule of
Reason ... focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions."
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possibility an exemption under article 85 (3)196 for economic reasons
which may be different from a simple "net positive effect" on com-
petition.
On the other hand, it may be argued that in the last few years
American courts have been much more willing to interpret the Sherman
Act in a fashion more sensitive toward the needs of the consumers,
even if this may in some cases be inconsistent with the overall protection
of competition. 97 If this pattern of development continues, American
antitrust law may rid itself of those elements which currently distinguish
it from the EEC antitrust provisions. Indeed, some practical aspects of
the application of the two statutes, other than the general approach,
are substantially the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Such aspects
include, for instance, the assimilation of parent and subsidiary companies
for the purpose of the application of the statutes1 9s and the system used
to ascertain the existence of a dominant position in a market. 199
Again, however, these superficial similarities cannot mask some basic
differences which reflect the different goals of the two statutes. Several
circumstances seem to confirm this assumption.
First, the criminal nature of violations of the Sherman Act, an
element not present under the EEC scheme, is one reflection of the
rigidity which characterizes the U.S. statute2°° as opposed to the flexi-
bility, necessary to achieve the integration of the national markets, which
is well established in the EEC.
Second, the requirement in the EEC system of a harm to interstate
trade as a condition necessary to trigger application of the sanctions 0'
contrasts strongly with the loose interpretation that the United States
Supreme Court has given to this requirement. 0 2
196. See text accompanying supra notes 73-89.
197. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 25 and 92-98 and accompanying text.
199. See text accompanying supra notes 128-34 and 162-65.
200. Of great interest in this context is the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), in which it was
held that an antitrust issue in an international setting may be subject to arbitration. The
Supreme Court, however, has left open the question pertaining to the enforceability of
the award in the United States, subordinating it to an examination by the competent
court on the compliance of the reward with the general principle of American public
policy. Thus, if the decision upon first glance may seem to mark the abdication by the
Supreme Court to the character of public policy of Sherman Act to a closer scrutiny, it
appears that almost nothing has been practically changed.
201. See text accompanying supra notes 38-50.
202. The Supreme Court has never attached great importance to the requirement,
present in the Sherman Act, of harm to interstate commerce. See, e.g., McLain v. Real
Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242, 100 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1980), where the Court concluded:
"Petitioners need not make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate
commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commissions rates .... "
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Third, the Sherman Act prohibits not only monopolies, but even
the attempt to create them. The Treaty of Rome, on the other hand,
outlaws only the abusive exploitation of a monopolistic position. 2 3 This
provides yet another illustration that certain restrictions of competition
are considered necessarily harmful in the United States, while in the
EEC, anti-competitive behavior may be tolerated as long as it may be
useful to achieve the aims of the Treaty of Rome, i.e., creation of an
integrated common market combined with economic development. The
absence in the U.S. system of a de minimis rule is further confirmation
of this observation.
Finally and, perhaps most significantly, that the ECJ has not de-
veloped any sort of "per se rule" which, although in retreat, is still
valid in the U.S., is the definitive, if needed, evidence of the greater
flexibility of the EEC system and of the need of the U.S. legislation
for some amendment which may enable the American courts to cope
better with a mature economy."
203. It is not without significance that article 86 does not speak about "monopoly"
but of "dominant position." It is worth remembering, however, that in the Continental
Can case the ECJ seemed to want to condemn monopolies tout court. For portions of
the opinion, see text accompanying supra notes 136-38.
204. See Gellhorn, Climbing the antitrust staircase, 31 Antitrust Bull. 341 (1986).
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